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Relations between business, state, and civil society in Latin America are conventionally discussed in antagonistic or hierarchical terms. This article challenges this position, developing a qualitative case study tracing the activities of an informal network of Brazilian businesspersons that, over the last three decades, promoted an agenda of sustainability, transparency, and civil society participation. Drawing from concepts in social movement theory, it is argued that a dynamic ‘movemental’ behaviour combining civil activism, organisational entrepreneurship, and fluid political alignment, allowed the group to establish lasting collaborative alliances with core actors in Brazilian democratic politics, and access relevant elite and policy-making circles. 
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This article analyses the socio-environmental activism of a group of Brazilian businesspersons involved in the creation of a business association known as Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais (PNBE, National Thought of the Business Bases,). The PNBE was among several business associations that emerged during the Brazilian democratic transition to influence the direction of industrial and economic policy. Contrary to formal peak associations and industry federations, such as the Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) and the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP), which were created by the state to aggregate the sectoral interests of the business class and facilitate economic governance, these ‘rival’ associations arose as a dissent strategy by business factions challenging the conservatism and verticalism of corporatist institutions, and their tenuous involvement in the democratisation process (Schneider, 2004, p. 113). 
Noted as a common occurrence during periods of economic opening and political reform, particularly in developing countries (Becker, 1990; Lucas, 1997; Diniz, 2010), scholarly assessments about their political relevance are mixed. In Brazil, while some authors saw in them an expression of the capacity of business to bypass its historical exclusion from decision-making (Mancuso, 2007), the bulk of the literature has been less enthusiastic. Ben Ross Schneider, (2004, p. 125) synthesises this latter position, stating that the ‘wavelike’ quality of Brazilian business associations – where after bursts of activity, they disband with little interest in institutionalising bases for future collective action – is a symptom of their limited effectiveness to channel sectoral demands. As a result, interest in this sort of business actor declined, with most available analyses focusing on events in the eighties and nineties (Payne, 1995; Kingstone, 1998; Hallewell and Bianchi, 2006). 
This article considers these assessments to be incomplete, hampered by a conventional interest group perspective that minimises the involvement of business in non-sectoral agendas, prioritises large and discrete business actors, and overlooks informal forms of resource mobilisation and claim-making (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008, p. 1110). Institutionalist analyses conclude that the ‘direct, individualised, personalised links between business people (or business families) and individual politicians’ (Schneider, 2013, p. 44) in Latin America grant disproportionate influence to big business, incentivising clientelistic and partisan relations aimed at extracting state concessions, shoring privileged positions, and raising barriers to entry (Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider, 1997). Pluralist arguments maintain similar views, considering that recurrent state intervention in business organisation has reinforced rent-seeking and cartel-like behaviours, in detriment of public goods and economic growth (Moore and Hamalai, 1993), the representation of small actors (Shadlen, 2004), and even democratic values (Bartell and Payne, 1995). Consequently, asymmetrical access to the state is expected to limit business interest in wider social agendas, and incentives to invest in collective organisation. 
The article defies these conclusions. Drawing from social movement theory, an alternative paradigm of collective action whose conceptual convergence with business politics is beginning to be explored (Soule, 2012; De Bakker et al., 2013), the article examines the activities of a small group of businesspersons connected with the early PNBE as an elite ‘corporate advocacy network’, highlighting the formal and informal dimensions of their strategic interaction with other social actors, and alternative forms of achieving political influence. Thus, the article contributes to the literature as it empirically illuminates the masked ‘civil society’ side of business politics, pointing to unusual patterns of collective action and business-society collaboration that emerge when profit-seeking and corporatist interests are not considered the sole drivers of corporate mobilisation. 
As Johnston (2014, p.9) noted, the line separating social movements and interest groups is often blurred. Nonetheless, it is accepted that the former are characterised by their reliance on extra-institutional forms of claim-making, networked structures involving organisational and individual participants with varied commitment and involvement, orientation towards broad social change goals not easily linked to sectoral interests, and a degree of spatio-temporal cohesion and continuity (Della Porta and Diani, 1999; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2002; Tarrow, 2012). The latter allows distinguishing social movements, which display a more consolidated collective identity, grassroots structure, and routine interaction among members, from more flexible formations such as advocacy networks, where there is alignment behind shared values, but a grassroots structure is lacking and routine interaction is less frequent (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). This paradigm also provides an alternative view of influence to the one preferred by interest group accounts: the capacity to produce favourable policy changes or extract sectoral concessions. Instead, considering that movemental actors are engaged in cultural as much as political conflict, influence can be evaluated according to a group’s capacity to ‘achieve more central positions in networks of social and political influence’, and factors such as the strength and duration of associational ties, the quality of a group’s allies, and the degree of integration of prominent group members in other elite networks (Diani, 1997, p. 133). This recognises that networks and movements often wield influence indirectly, augmenting their social recognition and ‘practical authority’ due to being perceived as useful for dealing with particular collective action problems, such as raising money, diffusing ideas, or coordinating multiple institutions (Abers and Keck, 2013, p. 9). This capital points to a group’s social embeddedness, as revealed partly by its ‘centrality’ and ‘brokerage’: the capacity to attract support for specific initiatives, and the capacity to connect sectors holding different stances or world views (Diani, 2003, p. 14).
Accordingly, the article demonstrates that over the last thirty years a network of former PNBE leaders successfully deployed a hybrid strategy combining both civil society and business mobilisation, and tactical alignment with different political projects. Mobilising organisational structures and interpersonal ties, this strategy allowed this small group to establish lasting linkages with elite business, civil society, and political actors, and to marshal significant material and symbolic resources behind an agenda of civil society organisation, sustainability, and transparency, and an array of related initiatives. This allowed the group to consolidate its authority as a relevant broker, and to gain access to important police-making and agenda-influencing circles and institutions. 
The article examines this through a qualitative study describing the activities of this corporate network from their beginnings in the eighties until Dilma Rousseff’s re-election, relying on the mentioned concepts to navigate complex contextual factors and diffuse relations among actors. The narrative is chronological and information-rich, structured according to two general phases in the development of the group’s influence. The first section covers the period from the democratic transition until the arrival of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT) to power, when the group consolidated its ‘movemental’ strategy and achieved visibility and authority in diverse social networks. The second section covers developments from 2003 to 2014, when, first, the group consolidated its centrality on the basis of close relations with the government, business associations, and civil society, and later, deepened its activism on matters of sustainability and corruption. This structure allows ordering detailed and fragmented evidence drawn from both secondary literature and multiple primary sources, including institutional resources, organisational websites, and media venues, as well as insight from interviews conducted with local sustainability non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during 2011.



Hybrid Activism in the Transition Years

The transitional context incentivised the emergence of several rival business associations, with eight new entities appearing between 1980 and 1989 (Troiano, 2009, p. 12). Among them was the PNBE, started in 1985 as an informal group of young entrepreneurs, owners and executives from medium-sized and small companies from São Pablo, interested in the democratisation of business representation and seeking to influence the upcoming Constitutional Assembly of 1988. Though many PNBE participants were FIESP members, the relationship with this entity deteriorated in 1987, when the PNBE leadership – composed by personalities such as Emerson Kapaz, from Elka Plastics, Oded Grajew, from the toy company Grow Jogos, Sergio Mindlin, from Metal Leve (then the largest Brazilian manufacturer of automobile engine parts), Helio Mattar from the home appliances firm Dako Fogões, Guilherme Leal, from the personal care firm Natura, and Ricardo Young, from Yázigi Internexus (a language school franchise), among others – organised a separate meeting with the Finance Minister Bresser Pereira, resulting in their expulsion from the body (Schneider, 2004, p. 114). In 1990, the PNBE became formally constituted, with Grajew, Kapaz, Mindlin, Young, and Mattar, as well as Eduardo Capobianco, from the construction holding Agrocap, occupying the general coordination of the association during the next decade.
While other rival business associations, like the União Brasileira de Empresarios (Union of Brazilian Businessmen), Ação Empresarial Integrada (Integrated Business Action), and the Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Industrial (Institute for Industrial Development Studies, IEDI), emerged to enhance sectoral coordination and lobby economic and industrial policy (Doctor, 2003, p. 344; Schneider, 2004, p. 119), a differential trait of the early PNBE was its broader social orientation. Economically, it promoted market liberalisation, albeit along national-developmental lines, and critical of neoliberal recipes and capital concentration (Diniz and Boschi, 1993). Politically, it championed sectoral bargaining and rent distribution policies, advocated for ethical behaviour among political and business elites, and called for the protection of the country’s material and human capital. Accordingly, the PNBE was the first business association to support a more cooperative relationship with labour, at a time when business federations held deeply antagonistic views of novo sindicalismo and its political wing, the PT. Oded Grajew, for example, claims to be the first businessperson to have set foot in the premises of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) in São Paulo, and to have established personal contacts with Lula da Silva by 1984 (Grajew, 2005). In 1987, the PNBE organised a mission taking several trade union and PNBE representatives to Israel to study social pacts, and a year later did the same to the US, in relation to public debt. In the early nineties, as it expanded (with 300 fee-paying members by 1993), the PNBE accentuated its involvement in public debates. It actively sponsored a plan to stabilise the Brazilian economy after the failure of the Plan Cruzado, organised the first encounters between peak associations and trade unions to discuss an eventual national pact, and gained notoriety as the first business group to join the movement calling for the impeachment of President Collor de Mello (Schneider, 1997, p. 106). 
The arrival of Cardoso to the presidency, however, initiated the period of organisational decay (the PNBE still exists, but it never regained the visibility of these early years). While some of its leaders were concerned with the president’s pro-market inclinations, most saw in Cardoso a political moderniser that would advance the organisation’s goals (Payne, 1995). Subsequently, some of its leaders accepted positions in federal and state administrations under the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (​https:​/​​/​pt.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Partido_da_Social_Democracia_Brasileira​) (PSDB): among them, Helio Mattar assumed as Vice-Minister of National Production, and Emerson Kapaz was appointed Secretary of Science, Technology, and Economic Development of the state of São Paulo (and was later elected Congressman) (Hallewell and Bianchi, 2006, p. 61). Others supported the opposition, with Grajew and Jorge Luiz Abrahão (from Sociotec Engineering) formalising links with the PT: by 1994, Grajew was leading Lula’s candidacy business committee, mobilising corporate support for the party, and in 1995, both co-founded the Associação Brasileira de Empresários pela Cidadania (CIVES), a NGO representing petista businesspeople (Pomar, 1995). The pro-Cardoso majority nonetheless tilted the orientation of the PNBE from social pacts and development towards structural reforms. As a result, its membership polarised, losing 40 percent of its members by end of the decade, among them, many of its founders (Assis, 2008). 
This downward trajectory concurs with the mainstream conclusion in the literature that rival business associations proved incapable of intermediating interests and maintaining coherence vis-à-vis conventional corporatist bodies, experiencing processes of polarisation, incorporation, and decay in the post-transitional period (Schneider, 2004, p. 124). However, the PNBE constituted but one dimension of the collective activism of some core members. 


Organising Civil Society

Business was not the only sphere where the PNBE founders pursued their political vision, neither the PNBE the only organisational vehicle through which they did so. As expressed by Alvaro Bianchi (2001, p.138), some PNBE leaders were characterised by a ‘global hegemonic vocation’, envisioning a ‘deep cultural and political transformation’ of the country on the basis of the permanent mobilisation of society around pressing social concerns. Beyond a collaborative view of industrial relations, this vision called for the organisation of Brazilian civil society, still weak and fragmented after several decades of authoritarian corporatism, and with little access to authorities and influence groups (Koslinski and Reis, 2009). Accordingly, a second front of civil activism was developed in parallel to the PNBE. 
In 1989, Grajew, Kapaz, and others promoted within the Associação Brasileira dos Fabricantes de Brinquedos (Brazilian Association of Toy Manufacturers, ABRINQ), the creation of a Directorship for the Defence of Children’s Rights, which alongside other organisations, successfully lobbied the Congress to pass the Statute of Children and Teenagers of 1990. On that same year, many of the PNBE co-founders created the ABRINQ Foundation, a NGO with the mission of ‘[ensuring] respect for the rights of children in compliance with national and international standards’, and ‘mobilising society’ around childhood problems (Raufflet and Gurgel do Amaral, 2007, p. 123). The ABRINQ Foundation, which achieved rapid notoriety and became the leading charity concerning children and teenagers’ rights in Brazil (by 2010, it was the local representative of Save the Children International), adopted UNICEF’s articulation model connecting civil society and the corporate community with specific social agendas (Ibid., p. 122), a model its founders gradually extended to other areas. In 1993, the PNBE, the ABRINQ Foundation, and the Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE), one of the most influential policy think tanks in Brazil, co-organised a nation-wide campaign against hunger, which among other things called for a greater participation of Brazilian firms – in particular state-controlled ones – in areas of health and education (Torres and Mansur, 2008). After the election of Cardoso, the PNBE sponsored the Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Saúde (Institute for the Development of Health) and, in partnership with some of the largest corporate foundations in the country, promoted the formation of the Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas (GIFE), a charity consolidating private social investment in Brazil. In 1997, it co-launched the Instituto São Paulo, a multi-sectoral initiative supported by industry federations and universities focused on crime policy and urban violence, whose first President was Eduardo Capobianco, then the PNBE’s General Secretary (Jaime, 2006). Throughout these initiatives, the group continued collaborating with each other, despite political differences among members and even after some of them abandoned the PNBE. For example, in 2000, the (pro-PT) CIVES, the (PSDB-aligned) PNBE, the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG), and the Federation of Construction Companies of São Paulo (led by Capobianco), together with academics, lawyers, and several business federations, created Transparência Brasil, a think tank dealing with governmental transparency and electoral finances (TBrasil, 2013). This cooperation also indicates an increasing degree of programmatic alignment among group members with the agenda being promoted and the strategy adopted. 
Two initiatives created at the end of the nineties support this proposition: the Instituto Ethos de Empresas e Responsabilidade Social (Ethos), a business-backed NGO created in 1998 by Grajew, Kapaz, Mattar, Leal, Mindlin, and Capobianco with the goal of promoting corporate social responsibility among Brazilian firms, and the World Social Forum (WSF), an initiative devised by Grajew in 2000 (in collaboration with Francisco Whitaker, a PT and Catholic activist, co-founder of Trasparência Brasil) after his failure to introduce social and environmental concerns into the agenda of the World Economic Forum (WEF) (Peña and Davies, 2014). Though Ethos and the WSF are contrasting types of civil society projects, both reflect the continuity of the movemental vocation of the group. Thus, while Ethos’ mission laid aside the more political elements of the early PNBE, it incorporated the wider social vision of the ABRINQ Foundation, advocating the notion that business should have an active participation in ‘the construction of a just and sustainable society’, and integrating this view with ideas of private governance and environmental protection (Ethos, 2013). Within a markedly civil society framework, the WSF’s Charter of Principles reflected similar values, highlighting democratic pluralism, social solidarity, and economic sustainability (opposing neoliberalism but not explicitly capitalism) (WSF, 2001). 
The rapid success and visibility that both initiatives attained, testifies to the increasing capacity these businesspersons had to mobilise support behind their projects, and to their growing authority in diverse networks and area-issues. For instance, the first WSF organising committee was integrated by CIVES and influential social groups such as IBASE, ABONG, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (​http:​/​​/​www.mst.org.br​/​​) (MST), the CUT (the largest trade union), the Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (​https:​/​​/​www.google.co.uk​/​url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjR362qkqnSAhWhAcAKHb3iDpUQFggmMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpt.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FConfer%25C3%25AAncia_Nacional_dos_Bispos_do_Brasil&usg=AFQjCNFlpp9wKeylwu4JQFNLzmr0Ma4ozA&sig2=QxlKl0JxgLkVafyqgY1Kdw​) (Brazilian Conference of Catholic Bishops), the main organ of the Catholic Church in Brazil, and representatives of international networks such as Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l’Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC) and the Centre for Global Justice. Simultaneously, Ethos, first presided by Grajew and then by Young, experienced a spectacular growth in its fee-paying corporate membership: from 11 founding organisations in 1998, to 326 in 2000, to over 1,500 in 2013, with Young (2004) claiming that by 2004 this represented a third of the Brazilian GDP. 
In both cases, formal and informal ties with major private and political actors facilitated fundamental resources. The size of Ethos’ membership was possible because of the participation of the main industrial federations and the largest companies in the country, such as FIESP and Petrobras, a point further developed ahead. At the same time, the PT played a crucial role in indirectly subsidising the first two WSFs – the party then governed both Porto Alegre city and the state of Rio Grande do Sul – with the leader of IBASE later recognising that no forum would have been possible in Brazil without help from the state (Peña and Davies, 2014, p. 12). Hence, by the time the PT arrived to power, this network of businesspersons enjoyed substantial recognition as a leading corporate-civil society broker in the country as well as overseas, with Ethos participating in international sustainability governance, for instance, through the United Nations (UN) Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the WSF moving outside Brazil since 2004. 
The section ahead reveals that after the initial phase of ad-hoc mobilisation and brokering of the nineties, the following decade was one of expansion, bolstered by the growing centrality of the group in elite business and civil society circles, and significant access to an allied administration. 

Sustainability Politics under the PT 

In June 2002, Lula published his famous ‘Carta ao Povo Brasileiro’ (Letter to the Brazilian People), claiming that the PT represented a ‘broad alliance between popular and industrial sectors’ (Da Silva, 2002). By then, the PT had moderated its socialist orientation: against more radical sectors of the party, Lula promoted a hybrid neo-developmentalism – denominated ‘social liberalism’ by Bianchi and Braga (2005) and ‘left neoliberalism’ by Morais and Saad-Filho (2005) – that combined the expansion of financial and export-oriented activities with the extension of social protections, aiming to ‘democratise and modernise the country, making it fairer, efficient and, at the same time, more competitive in international markets’ (Da Silva, 2002). In the words of Guido Mantega – then principal advisor to Lula, later Minister of Planning and Chairman of the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES) – the PT’s project did not aspire to make capitalism more efficient, but rather to make it ‘more human’ (quoted in Bianchi and Braga, 2005, p.1753). 
	This discourse resonated with core tenets in the group’s social agenda: with the vision of the early PNBE, and its focus on social pacts and inter-sectoral debate, with the sustainability vision of Ethos, where firms, civil society, and state collaborate ‘for a fairer and more sustainable society’ (Mindlin, 2013), and even with the alternative globalisation ideals of the WSF, where once elected, Lula would give speeches next to Hugo Chávez. It also resonated with the developmental turn of local industrial elites, as the CNI, FIESP, and IEDI called for policies supporting domestic champions and the competitive substitution of imports (Diniz and Boschi, 2007). 
The network however, was hardly an outsider to this programmatic transition. Grajew, as President of Ethos, not only kept his role as the PT’s main business liaison – a growingly important function as party’s finances became increasingly reliant on private funding – but was the only businessperson, in addition to José Alencar, Lula’s running mate, in the small commission of politicians and scholars that drafted Lula’s governmental agenda ‘Um Brasil para Todos’ (PT, 2002, p. 72). Moreover, following Lula’s election, the group’s centrality consolidated. Grajew was appointed Special Advisor to the Presidency, in charge of business engagement with public policy and the program ‘Fome Zero’ (No Hunger). Other members saw the new president to be aligned with their collaborative vision: Helio Mattar, who had participated in the Cardoso government, welcomed Lula’s election given his commitment to the goals of the ABRINQ Foundation and to improving civil society participation, stating that the minister of Industry, Luiz Fernando Furlan (himself a businessman), called him the day after his appointment to consult about past experiences (Gullo & Chaim 2003). Many of them were selected by the Presidency to sit in the new multi-sectoral policy councils, on the basis of their ‘professional trajectory, influence and disposition’ (CDES, 2016). Grajew, Young, and later entries to the board of Ethos, such as Antoninho Trevisan, president of an accounting consultancy, and Daniel Feffer, vice-President of Suzano Pulp & Paper, were invited to join the prestigious Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Economic and Social Development Council, CDES), while Leal and Abrahão entered the Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Food Security Council, CONSEA). Relevantly, research indicates that the councils were inspired by an Ethos’ initiative applied in São Paulo city between 2001 and 2004, namely, the Fórum Empresarial de Apoio à Cidade de São Paulo (São Paulo City Business Support Forum) (Martins, 2009). 
Simultaneously, the group accentuated its presence in formal business bodies. Already between 1998-2001, seven elected FIESP directors were related with either the PNBE or Ethos (or both), including Grajew, Leal, Mattar, Mindlin, Capobianco, Kapaz, and Clarice Messer (de Toledo, 2005, p. 36). After 2003, many of them maintained high positions in these associations, with Capobianco becoming vice-President of FIESP in 2004, and Leal occupying advisory roles in both FIESP and IEDI (Natura had become one of the largest personal care firms in the world). Notably, on that year, the newly-elected leader of FIESP, Paulo Skaf, supported as a candidate by both the government and ABRINQ (Diniz and Boschi, 2004), created a Social Responsibility Committee within the organisation. The CNI followed a year later.
Certainly, these were not the only business actors to have enjoyed good relations with the Lula government, an administration characterised by its close links with financial and industrial elites (Lazzarini, 2011). Nonetheless, it is evident that by the mid-noughties, the group had cemented its centrality in important business, civil society, and political networks. Rather than a bottom-up ‘infiltration’, such as the one Falleti (2010, p.49) noted by the sanitarista movement, this group accessed institutions from the top, occupying interlocking roles in governance bodies on the basis of their social connections, resources, and public authority. This allowed their members to broker a vast network of influential partners and steer resources in support of their projects. Through the 2000s, many large firms, and particularly state-controlled ones, became recurrent sponsors of Ethos’ initiatives and WSF events (in Brazil): Petrobras was ‘master’ sponsor of Ethos’ annual conferences between 2004 and 2008, with other ‘gold’ contributors being Electrobras, Banco do Brasil, Vale, Caixa, Natura, and Bradesco, among other (sponsorships constitute approximately half of Ethos’ budget, and corporate membership fees another quarter) (Ethos, 2016). The magnitude of this hybrid state-corporate support mortified more radical (and foreign) civil society activists present in the 2010 WSF in Porto Alegre, and generated tensions with Brazilian organisers (Ojeda and Toussaint, 2010).  
According to conventional explanations, the institutional and ideological proximity this group developed with the Lula administration, closer than anything the PNBE developed under Cardoso, should have led to either internal polarisation, as it happened to the PNBE and other business associations, or to demobilisation, as experienced by many interest groups and movements co-opted by Lulismo (Alonso and Maciel, 2010). However, this did not occur: through the next decade, the network continued with its agenda even when it conflicted with the government, particularly as environmental and corruption grievances returned to the spotlight.  

Corruption, Ecologists and Industrialists 

Following the Mensalão scandal of 2005, an arrangement through which aides to the President used illegal side payments to win congressional votes, corruption returned as a dominant public concern. This scandal would have lasting repercussions, as it shattered the reputation of the PT as the ‘honest’ party in Brazilian politics, with former president Cardoso calling it the most extensive crisis in the history of the republic (Flynn, 2005, p. 1255): Lula narrowly escaped impeachment but his Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu, co-founder of the PT, had to resign and was banned from public office for eight years (and later imprisoned). The scandal contributed to disaffect sectors of the urban middle class, traditional supporters of the PT, as well as elements of the Brazilian intelligentsia and the party’s old leadership (Zucco, 2008; De Souza, 2013). This extended to members of the network, in particular the leftist faction closer to the PT: Grajew stated that ‘he was perplexed and disappointed with the party’ and decided not to participate in Lula’s 2006 re-election campaign (Scinocca, 2006). 
More importantly, this situation triggered a shift in the group’s advocacy, away from corporate practices and private governance, and back towards public policy and transparency questions. New initiatives were launched. In 2005, Ethos started the Pacto Empresarial pela Integridade e contra a Corrupção (Business Pact for Integrity and against Corruption), in collaboration with the Office of the Inspector-General of the Union (the main transparency agency in Brazil), the UN Development Program, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the WEF. In 2007, Grajew, Mindlin, Leal, and Young co-founded another business-backed NGO, the Rede Nossa São Paulo (NSP), to promote sustainable development and devise participatory mechanisms for monitoring campaign commitments and performance by local authorities (Alves, 2013). Interviews with Ethos and NSP representatives confirm that public policy became their main organisational focus around 2008, with an interviewee expressing that ‘the phase of raising awareness among companies is over. The next phase is changing the legal framework under which private and public activities take place’ (Interview with NSP 2011). 
This programmatic shift coincided with the activation of environmental grievances, when the fragile pact Lula concerted between rural and environmental movements and industrial sectors started to unravel. Lula had favoured the expansion of intensive agriculture and extractive industries, while appointing renowned rural activist Marina Silva as Minister of Environment and promoting the use of ethanol. This granted the government the support of agribusiness, the acquiescence of combative environmental movements, and recognition in international carbon diplomacy (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012). This approach matched the growing environmental focus displayed by the corporate network: first through Ethos, second with the creation of the Instituto Akatu, a sister-organisation presided by Mattar focused on sustainable consumption and resource management, and in 2005, with the promotion of São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA)’s Index of Corporate Sustainability (ISE), which still includes Ethos in its executive body.  
Nonetheless, a first conflict sparked in 2008 when Ethos (led by Young), Akatu (by Mattar), the SNP (by Grajew), and other NGOs such as Greenpeace Brasil and the Instituto Brasileiro de Defesa do Consumidor (Consumer Defence Institute, IDEC), accused Petrobras of violating regulations regarding the amount of sulphur in its diesel fuel, resulting in its exclusion from the ISE (Grajew, 2008). Petrobras’s management responded by accusing Ethos and its allies of a political smearing campaign, not only against the company, but against the government. Notably, Grajew replied saying that such accusation was explicitly directed at him; he ‘that always gave his full support to Lula, [he] that opened the doors of the business world for him’ (Mercadoetico, 2008). The conflict continued through 2009, when Petrobras’ CEO published an article in Harvard Business Review titled ‘The Greening of Petrobras’, which was challenged by Mattar and Young (Azevedo, 2009; Mattar and Young, 2009). As a result, Petrobras withdrew from Ethos, in an action perceived as trying to limit the latter’s independence (Interview with Ethos 2011). 
At this point, Petrobras was part of a conflict within the PT between industrialist and environmentalist factions, as the government’s energy policy, administered by Minister of Energy and Petrobras Chairwoman Dilma Rousseff, came into conflict with the environmentalist camp represented by Marina Silva, given projects to expand energy provisions via dams in the Amazon. This led Silva to quit her ministerial role and the party in 2009, and to join the small Partido Verde (PV), becoming its presidential candidate for the 2010 elections. Notably, Silva campaigned on an environmental platform calling for Brazil to become a low-carbon economy, contributing to introduce the sustainability agenda into the electoral contest, particularly as these events coincided with the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference (Viola and Franchini, 2013, p. 53). Ethos and its allies supported this position, coordinating a business coalition calling for a formal commitment to the reduction of carbon emissions, and producing a ‘Open Letter to Brazil on Climate Changes’ signed by twenty-two companies and institutions and delivered to the government (Ethos, 2009).
In a move suggestive of the Cardoso/Lula split within the early PNBE, an informal group of ‘green businesspersons’ and Ethos leaders – the term often used in the local press and by civil society, as I witnessed personally during fieldwork – liaised with Marina Silva after the resignation, and promoted her candidacy (Grabois, 2012). Guilherme Leal, then one of the richest persons in the world, sold his stake in Natura to compete as Silva’s vice-presidential candidate, while Ricardo Young ran for a Senate position. Silva obtained an unprecedented third position with 19 percent of the votes, the best results in the PV’s history, consolidating her as rising political leader. 
The result emboldened the new sustainability camp. After the 2010 elections, Silva, Leal, and others defected the PV – due to disagreements with the party’s internal democracy – and launched the Movemento por uma Nova Política, aimed at overcoming the deficit of representation of Brazilian democracy and promoting an alternative socio-economic vision, ‘socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable’. The movement defined itself as ‘free, open, autonomous and democratic, supra-party and without religious affiliation, pursuing the construction of environmental, social, economic, ethical, political, cultural and aesthetical sustainability’, while enshrining ‘fraternity and cooperation as political categories in the construction of the common good’ (MNP, 2013). 
Again, clear programmatic parallelisms and continuities are evident with previous initiatives sponsored by the network. The movement’s charter supported the movemental vision of politics and a cooperative view of state-society relations present in the founding principles of the PNBE (‘the possibility of participation of all segments of society’), of Ethos (‘cooperative actions are increasingly necessary for maintaining humanity’s welfare’), and the non-ideological democracy of the WSF (‘opposed to all totalitarian and reductionist views of economy, development, and history’) (WSF, 2001; Ethos, 2013; PNBE, 2013). Suggestively, in 2011, the head of Ethos and PT-supporter, Jorge Luiz Abrahão, directly linked the struggle against corruption in business and the public sector with the transition to a new economy; ‘greener, more inclusive, and mainly, more responsible’ (Abrahão, 2011). In 2012, Ethos and Amnesty International – supported by firms such as Suzano, Natura, Vale, and Walmart Brasil, among others – launched a manual titled ‘A Responsabilidade Social das Empresas no Processo Eleitoral’ (Corporate Social Responsibility in the Electoral Process), providing directives for business involvement in political financing (Ethos, 2012).
In the increasingly volatile political environment of the first Rousseff administration – as new corruption scandals emerged (even before the Petrolão scandal of 2014), the economy slowed down, and with protest movements surging during October 2011 (against corruption) and June-July 2013 (against the political establishment and social services’ deficits) – the MNP moved towards political institutionalisation. Aiming to compete in the 2014 elections, the MNP decided to form a ‘movement party’ under the name of Rede Sustentabilidade, calling for the reform of the political system and positioning as the ethical and modern alternative to the ‘old’ and corrupt politics represented by both the PT and the PSDB (Barata and Garcia, 2011). Due to problems in registering the required signatures, the Rede was forced to compete in the elections under the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) – obtaining again a fifth of the votes – and was only constituted as an independent party in September 2015.
Then again, in addition to normative alignment, the involvement of Leal, Young, and their network was instrumental to supply Silva with influential allies and resources. For instance, Marie Alice Setubal, of the family owning the Itaú Bank and president of the Tide Setubal Foundation, who became Silva’s education advisor, declared that she approximated the Rede through her acquaintances with Grajew (who supported but did not join the new party) and his colleagues, and their work on the ‘sustainability movement’ (Campana, 2014). Setubal, along with Leal, were the main individual contributors to Silva’s 2014 presidential campaign, while other green businesspersons participated in Silva’ electoral team (Istoe, 2014). This corporate support, plus her hybrid economic policies – a green economy with fiscal discipline and inflation targets – led the PT to accuse Silva of being ‘the candidate of business’. Ironically, this was the title of an open letter the president of Ethos authored a decade earlier, encouraging business to endorse Lula’s candidacy (Grajew, 2002). 

Conclusion 

This article has explored the remarkable trajectory of a small network of businesspersons that over the last three decades played a central role in promoting ideas of sustainability and social responsibility in Brazil. While relevant questions remain regarding the effectiveness and integrity of these initiatives, particularly in light of recent events, the article nonetheless challenges conclusions about the weakness, social participation, and influence of Latin American business associations, exposing the limitations of analyses that engage with business action guided by interest group perspectives.
The article claims that framing the group as an elite advocacy network better captures its behaviour and how it pursued influence and sustained cooperation through time, pointing to its dynamic use of mobilisational strategies and resources (material and symbolic) to promote a civil-normative agenda. Even when unequivocal policy inputs could not be directly validated, the article provided evidence of rising centrality, and highlighted discursive and programmatic similarities across diverse civil society and political projects where group members participated, with core principles concerning sustainability, ethics and transparency, and cross-sectoral collaboration reappearing through time. Whether members developed a movemental identity is perhaps more contentious, though sustained and consistent collaboration across political and sectoral boundaries is a strong indicative of certain collective, yet fluid, identification with the above-mentioned values, with figures like Grajew and Mattar identifying more as civil activists, while others maintaining a more corporate profile, such as Leal. 
Hence, against conventional assessments about the weakness of business associations in Brazil, it appears that the ‘wavelike’ movemental features displayed by this small network are not so much a deficit, but an advantage, granting it with ideological and organisational flexibility from broader partisan and sectoral positions, and ameliorating risks of internal polarisation and political capture. Whether this will continue to be the case, given, on the one side, the enthusiastic and polemic way in which organised business supported Rousseff’s impeachment, and, on the other, the involvement of major firms in the Lava Jato scheme (four of which were Ethos members), is to be seen, though already the group responded by further aligning with actors better representative (so far) of its normative programme, such as Marina Silva and the influential Ordem dos Advogados (Order of Attorneys).
Arguably, the group strikes as rather exceptional. As Brazilian institutions are characterised by hybrid forms of participation, combining civil society and political movements with resilient hierarchical structures that ease access to concentrated and resourceful actors (Avritzer, 2006; Kröger, 2012), this elite group seems to have been ideally positioned to exploit available opportunities. Nonetheless, while careful in terms of generalising findings, the case supports recent research connecting the participation of Latin American business in processes of institutional change with broader patterns of societal relations, as it has been noted in relation to security provision in Colombia (Moncada, 2013), soy production in Argentina (García-López and Arizpe, 2010), and small business finance in Mexico (Canales, 2016). In the classic argument by Evans (1996), the degree of the state embeddedness – the complex patterns of interaction, social ties and loyalties connecting the public apparatus with civil society – is a determining factor in the effectiveness of capability-enhancing state interventions. This article suggests that the reverse can also be case: state embeddedness can grant private actors, including small business networks, the capacity to effectively ‘project’ themselves onto the state and other social institutions.
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